Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism

SR No.: 001617
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 272
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Nyay, & Spiritual
File Size: 16 MB

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246 :: Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism
particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we may thus call it negation, sūnyatā, in this sense." We cannot suppose that affirmation and negation are pure ascriptions totally false, for, then, they cannot lead to the truth of reality. The bhūtatathātā or the sūnya must be such as includes all the opposing drstis and is still above them. For the Buddha it is above the four koțis (forms of predication) and for the Jaina it is above the seven bhangas (form of predication). This again brings us to the same position where Kundakunda's philosophy culminates. The sūnya or the bhūtatathātā must be the same principle as the nonabsolute of the Jaina.
Hegelian Absolute
According to Collingwood Hegel's reality is neither a delusion nor a mere appearance which may be said to exist with respect to the perceiving minds, but it is something which exists independently of them. Though it is of the nature of thought yet its transformation are such as savour materiality. For Hegel, what we call matter is only a form of intelligence-a petrified intelligence. The movement of Hegelian dialectic is such as gives rise to contradiction. “The finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.” For every thesis there is the antithesis, but the process does not end at this contradiction. Then there comes the synthesis wherein the contradiction is supposed to disappear. Hegel proceeds from the lower to the higher, and thus, when he reaches the highest (if it is at all attainable) the contradiction totally disappears. This is the absolute of Hegel. W. James observes: “Hegel considers that the immediate, finite data of experience are 'untrue' because they are not their own others. They are negated by
1. Das Gupta: A History of Indian Philosoplıy. Vol I, p. 130 2. Cf: R.G. Collingwood: The Idea of Nature, p. 124 3. W. James: A Pluralistic Universe, p. 85