Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism

SR No.: 001617
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 272
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Nyay, & Spiritual
File Size: 16 MB

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238 :: Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism
soul. But at the same time there is a danger that the soul may be taken to be a void. It is for this reason that we cannot eliminate the positive statements in the soul, they have their own importance. So we shall have to maintain that the antithesis of 'neti' in the form ‘tadeveti' (that it is) is also descriptive of the soul. When the two theses are combined together, as is the aim of the anekānta philosophy, we shall get still a fuller description of the soul. The aforesaid theses represent the ordinary way of our thinking. Reality cannot be exhausted by these partial truths, but at the same time the partial descriptions of the soul must be held true in their proper universes of discourse. When the niścaya-naya simply negates the vyavahāra, it will have nothing positive as its content. As absolute negation has no meaning and it is always the affirmation of something implied by it implicitly, the niscaya naya must be pointing to something positive, it cannot be a mere negation. At the same time it is simply a naya bound with some thesis. Our conclusion then, is that the niscaya naya must not be purely negative. From this niscaya point of view Kundakunda (in his Samayasāra) and Nemicandra (in his Dravyasaṁgraha) make a number of statements which convey a positive information. Thus we cannot agree with what Rājamalla holds that the niscaya naya is negative and inexpressible. The truths yielded by the niscaya naya may be held to be valuable, because ethically they are most useful. Kundakunda repeatedly establishes the pure cognitive nature of the soul from the pure point of view. We know that knowledge is one of the attributes of the soul, and the identity of the soul is not exhausted by it. So the soul as only a pure knower is an isolation from a totality. This isolation may be important again from the ethical viewpoint, but the absence of attachment and aversion in the soul are presupposed by it. Thus the niscaya naya yields an information which falls short of complete and true description of the soul.