Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism

SR No.: 001617
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 272
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Nyay, & Spiritual
File Size: 16 MB

Page 190

186 Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism
soul, they cannot be held responsible for the limitation of the soul.1
Nor can it be held that the karmas constitute an immaterial substance parallel to the soul. Akalanka objects to such a position, because "an immaterial entity cannot help or hinder the function of another immaterial entity. Just as space does not help or hinder the function of the other categories like the dik (direction), etc., in the same way an immaterial karma cannot help or hinder the function of the immaterial soul." The underlying idea is that, if the adṛṣṭa, the apūrva, the samskāra or the karma is an immaterial principle, it cannot effect limitation and distortion of the soul's powers. Vidyānandin points out that "no karmas are seen to fructify directly or indirectly without the association of matter, so it cannot be held that the karmas are not material." The former argument tries to deny immaterial nature of the karma, while the latter one affirms materiality of the karmas. Yośovijaya also argues that "Materiality of karmas is a correct notion because they effect otherdeterminedness (pāratantrya) of the soul. If it is held due to the soul's capacities, it cannot be effected at all. Necessarily that which is an attribute of something cannot effect its limitation or pāratantrya. Nor can we say that the jiva is not so limited.... The karma is material for the consciousness of pleasure, etc., takes place in its association. That in whose association pleasure etc. are felt is always seen to be material like food, etc. That which is not material is not seen to effect pleasure, etc., by its association like ākāśa or space."4
The Sankhyan position involves a greater inconsistency on account of the absolute immutablity of the self. Das Gupta remarks that "If, again, by the varying states of pleasure and pain the nature of puruşa cannot be affected, then in cannot be regarded as an enjoyer, and if could be
1. Ibid., p. 66
2. Akalanka: Rājavārtika, 8.2.5
3. Yośovijaya: Nyāyāloka, p. 178
4. Yośovijaya: Nyāyāloka, p. 178