Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism

SR No.: 001617
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 272
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Nyay, & Spiritual
File Size: 16 MB

Page 176

172 :: Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism
Idealism and the Plurality of Souls
Regarding the problem of the plurality of souls the idealistic school of philosophy divides itself into two groups. The first group consist of the Sarkarites. Sarkara's idealism is distinguished from that of others by the fact that it holds differences to be mere delusions. So the plurality of souls, for Sarkara, is not a true conception but is only a delusion. Sankara distinguishes between the empirical and the transcendental levels of existence and holds the truth of the plurality of souls at the former only. He marks a difference from the views of other idealist thinkers by admitting both the existence and the perception at the empirical level as delusive. These levels of existence and perception being determined by māyā Sarkara's success wholly depends upon the conception of māyā. The second group consists of those idealists who hold the truth of differences. Rāmānuja, Hegel and the Neo Hegelians may be taken to belong to it. They think that there is the plurality of selves in the world, but it is derived from the same monistic principle.
Hegel, Bradley and Rāmānuja on the Pluratity of Souls and their Criticism
On account of the affinity between the Jaina conception of the plurality of souls and the views of the thinkers belonging to the second group it is desirable to consider the views of the thinkers of the latter group first. In Hegel's philosophy we see that, in spite of the great import of difference, there is an inclanation towards monism and unity of thought. It is why we see a reaction against this tendency in Bradley who holds the truth of differences even in the Absolute. If differences are affirmed of the absolute, the position must lead to the plurality of souls equally consistently. Bradleian view of the absolute just opposes the conception of the merging of differences into the unity of the absolute. Bradley never comes to the conclusion that the absolute is a mere unity. Unity and difference are seen to