Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism

SR No.: 001617
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 272
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Nyay, & Spiritual
File Size: 16 MB

Page 163

Bliss as an Attribute of the Soul :: 159
faculty of feeling, the nomenclature being borrowed from the free manifestations of the mentioned faculty.
Bliss as Non-Distinct from Knowledge (Views of Akalanka, Amrtacandra, Jayasena and Śrutasāgara Sūri)
Akalanka holds that bliss is identical with knowledge. Amrtacandra Sūri observes that bliss and knowledge are the nature of the soul, and bliss is non-distinct from knowledge.? Jayasena comments: "The material cause of the infinite bliss, which is desirable from all points of view, is the simultaneously all-comprehensive perfect knowledge; and the sensuous knowledge, being incapable of simultaneously apprehending all its objects, is not the caue of bliss."3 Śrutasāgara Suri admits very clearly the nondistinct identity of bliss from knowledge and conation. He says: "Bliss is a mode of knowledge and conation, hence it is not destroyed in the liberated state)."4 The distinction of bliss from knowledge may be conceived in two ways. Firstly they are mutually distinct as attributes of the soul-a view held by the author of the Pañcādhyāyī. Secondly bliss and knowledge can be distinguished as implications of the same attuibute. The view that establishes the identity of bliss and knowledge must distinguish them at least as traits of the same attribute or mode. The view of Srutasāgara Sūri is the most startling one, as it admits bliss as the mode of two attributes, i.e., conation and knowledge.
Criticisn of the above Views
We may begin our criticism with a consideration of Śrutasāgara's view. He must mean that some modes of
1. Akalanka: Rājavārtika, p. 642 2. Amrtacandra: Tattvadipikāvrtti of Pravacanasāra, pp. 27 and 69 3. Jayasena: Tātparyavrtti of Pravacansāra, p. 74 4. Sruta sāgara: Tattvärtha - vrtti, p. 320