Samayasara

SR No.: 001607
Original Sutra Author: Kundkundacharya
Author: Hiralal Jain, A N Upadhye
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1944
Total Pages: 370
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Religion, & Philosophy
File Size: 8 MB

Page 108

INTRODUCTION
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philosophical doctrines of Sat and Dravya and if we remember that the ultimate reality is a permanent and changing entity manifesting through constant change of appearance and disappearance, then we can understand that a fact of reality when looked at from the underlying permanent substance may be described to be unchanging and permanent, where from the point of view of the modes which appear and disappear, the thing may be described to be non-permanent and changing. This difference of aspect is called Naya technically by the Jaina thinkers. Describing a thing from the aspect of the underlying substance or Dravya is called Dravyarthikanaya whereas the description based upon the modifications or changes is called Paryayarthikanaya. Thus the same fact of reality may be apprehended and described from the Paryāyārthikanaya or from Dravyarthikanaya. From the point of view of the former it may be called an ever-changing fact whereas from the latter point of view it may be said to be an unchanging permanent entity. Hence these two apparently contradictory logical propositions though applicable to the same fact of reality are predicated from two distinct aspects, one emphasising the underlying substance, the other emphasising the changing modes. If we recognise that the conflicting predications are logically possible and fully significant since they refer to two different aspects of view, the logical doctrine of Asti-Năsti Vada looses much of its mystery and apparent contradictory nature. This Asti-Nästi Vada doctrine is further elaborated by Jaina Logicians. Take the case of a piece of furniture, the chair or the table before us. If we enquire into the nature of the material, the timber, the same piece of furniture admits of two different logical propositions, one affirmative and the other negative.
If the chair is made of Rosewood then it is capable of being described as furniture made of rosewood. Can we describe the same chair as made of teakwood ? Certainly Not. We have to say emphatically that it is not made of teakwood. The same piece of furniture therefore admits an affirmative proposition that it is made of rosewood, when you take into consideration the actual timber out of which it is made and a negative proposition that is it not made of teakwood when you take into consideration some other timber alien to its own nature. Similarly when we want to know whether a piece of furniture is in the drawing room or in the verandah of your house, and if it actually exists in the drawing room we have to say that is in the drawing room and it is not in the verandah. It is according to this doctrine of Asti-Nasti Vāda as elaborated by the Jaina logicians every fact of reality may be described according to four different conditions-Dravya, Kşetra, Kala and Bhava-Nature of the substance, the place where it is, the time when it exists, and the characteristics intrinsically presented in it. Every object from its own Dravya or substance admits of an affirmative predication and looked at from the paradravya, alien substance, admits of a negative predication,