Jaina Philosophy and Religion

SR No.: 001604
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nyayavijay
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 500
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Epistemology
File Size: 12 MB

Page 375

Jaina Logic
it should contain some term suggesting that the statement is made from one particular standpoint. Without that term the answer appears incomplete. From this, it follows that while predicating a particular attribute of a thing, we should formulate a statement in such a manner that the opposite attribute which is there in the thing does not stand negated. This means that while describing a thing as permanent we should put such a word in the statement as would stop the rise of the suggestion that there is in the thing absence of the attribute impermanence. And while describing a thing as impermanent, we should use some such word in the statement as would stop the rise of the suggestion that there is in the thing absence of the attribute permanence. Similarly, one should be careful in the same way while describing a thing as existent, non-existent, etc. Such a word in Sanskrit is 'syat'. The meaning of the term 'syāt', as already pointed out, is 'from a particular standpoint'. So in the Sanskrit statement, the word 'syat' or its synonym 'kathañcit' (meaning 'from a certain standpoint') is to be employed, as in the statement 'syat anityaḥ eva ghaṭaḥ' ('From a certain standpoint, the pot is certainly impermanent'); in this statement 'syäť' is employed in order not to rule out the attribute permanence which is present in the pot from another standpoint.
The above presentation is philosophical. But all our worldly dealings are conducted through statements made from this or that standpoint (nayavāda). In worldly dealings, people make statements from one particular standpoint which is governed by the purpose in hand. Depending on the purpose aimed at, sometimes some one property and sometimes some other is desired to be expressed. Thus in our worldly dealings, it is this desire or intention of the speaker that determines the aspect (of a thing) which he expressly predicates of a thing. This is the reason why we do not employ the term 'syat' in the statements which we make in our worldly dealings. It is only to give the idea of a comprehensive (all-sided) view of reality that the term 'syat' is employed in a statement.
There are two fundamental answers to any question. In answer, we say 'yes' or 'no'. That is, we answer in affirmation or negation. As a matter of fact, a thing can be described by two fundamental propositions-one affirmative and the other negative. The sevenfold predication or judgement (saptabhangi) is formulated on the basis of these two fundamental modes. The ways or modes of answering a question are called bhanga. There can be only seven modes or ways. And a set of these seven modes
347