Jaina Philosophy and Religion

SR No.: 001604
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nyayavijay
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 500
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Epistemology
File Size: 12 MB

Page 33

Essentials of Jaina Philosophy
the things in the past can remember those things later on, and any other sense-organ has not seen the things in the past. To explain the phenomenon in point, we have to posit some entity that has seen the things in the past and remembers those very things later on. This entity is given the name 'soul'. Soul that has seen the thing in the past through the visual sense-organ remembers that very thing later on even when it is devoid of the visual sense-organ. Soul can remember the thing experienced in the past because the past experience has left behind its impressions which the soul continues to retain and carry with it, and it is these impressions, when revived, that give rise to the memory of the thing which was the object of that experience.
We do have the experience in the form 'I saw a particular thing, then I touched it, and after that I smelt and tasted it'. If we reflect a little on this experience, it will become quite clear to us that the one who saw the thing, the one who touched it, the one who smelt it and the one who tasted it are not different but one and the same. Who is that one? It cannot be a visual sense-organ, because its function is only to see and not to touch, etc., also. It cannot be a tactile sense-organ because its function is only to touch and not to see, etc., also. Similarly, it cannot be an olfactory sense-organ or a gustatory sense-organ, because the function of the former is to smell and that of the latter is to taste. This fact doubtlessly proves that the one who sees, touches, smells and tastes is different from sense-organs. And that is the soul.
Soul has no colour whatsoever. So like physical objects, it is not perceived by the visual sense-organ. But on that account it cannot be said that it does not exist. Though physical atoms are not amenable to visual sense perception, their existence is accepted on the basis of inference. Any gross physical object requires its material cause for its production. This material cause, itself being an effect, requires its own material cause for its production. This process will go on ad infinitum, if atoms are not posited as the ultimate cause of all physical effects. Thus is proved the existence of physical atoms. Similarly, means other than sense perception prove the existence of the soul. If atoms having physical qualities cannot be grasped by sense perception, how can one expect the soul bereft of physical qualities to be an object of sense perception?
Many times we observe that the acts performed by a person do not give their fruits to that person in his entire life and that the fruits he enjoyed in his entire life are not the fruits of the acts he performed. Many times