Jaina Philosophy and Religion

SR No.: 001604
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nyayavijay
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 500
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Epistemology
File Size: 12 MB

Page 207

Metaphysics, Ethics and Spiritual Development
179
revealing itself. The invalid cognition (doubt, illusory cognition) can never reveal the external object; this is quite obvious.
All objects in the world have general as well as specific characteristics. Not directing its attention to the specific characteristics of a thing, when consciousness directs its attention mainly to the general characteristics of the thing, the form that the consciousness assumes is called darśana. On the other hand, not directing its attention to the general characteristics of a thing, when consciousness directs its attention mainly to the specific characteristics of the thing, the form that the consciousness assumes is called jñāna. The transformation of pure consciousness into cognitive operation or cognition (upayoga) is generally divided into two types— general cognition and specific cognition. The cognition which cognises an object in its general form is general cognition. And the cognition which cognises an object in its specific form is specific cognition. Specific cognition is described as sākära, while general cognition is described as nirākāra. In this context, by the term 'akāra' we are to understand specific characteristics or form. So nirākāra means that which does not have specific characters or form as its content. Therefore, nirākāra cognition means that cognition which does not grasp the specific characteristics or form. Thus the general cognition is nirākāra, while the specific cognition is sākāra. The former is darśana, while the latter is jñāna.
General cognition concentrates on the general characteristics. So at this stage, there arises the consciousness of identity or similarity. Specific cognition concentrates on the specific characteristics. So at this stage, there arises the consciousness of difference or particularity. First there takes place general cognition and specific cognition follows it. This is generally the order of their occurrence. Before we cognise a thing in a detailed way, there is the stage where we cognise it in a general way. First we simply cognise a thing as belonging to a class. If this stage is not experienced, there can be no specific-detailed-cognition of the thing. How can there arise the specific cognition without first there being the general-detail-less cognition? Let us understand the difference between
of the nature of light. This is the only reason why it reveals the external objects. Similarly, cognition reveals external objects, only because it reveals itself. That which itself is not of the nature of light—that is, which does not reveal itself-can never reveal other things. A particular cognition (say, pot-cognition) cognises an external object (pot); therefore, it must be self-revelatory. Thus it is proved that cognition is self-revelatory (self-cognitive).