Jaina Philosophy of Language

SR No.: 001601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 2006
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Language
File Size: 10 MB

Page 96

(70) : Jaina Philosophy of Language related with the object and on the other hand with the meaning of the word.
The Naiyāyikas have criticised the theory of image. Firstly, according to them, as there are many individuals so also there should be many images or figures too. Moreover, the image of one individual is different from that of the other; as such one word cannot express many figures, which are naturally different from each other. Further, it is impossible for an individual that he may comprchend figures of all the individuals of a class because all the particulars or individuals are different and therefore, there cannot be a single image for them. The figure of a white cow will be different from that of a black cow. Thus, we will have to postulate multiple meanings of a word if we accept the theory of figure' (ākstivāda). Furthermore, the compatibility of action (artha-kriya-kāritva) is ascertained by individual and not by the images, for example, where one individual asks another to bring a cow or to remove it, the other does not bring or remove the image of the figure of a cow. The Naiyāyikas therefore, do not regard the theory of figure as correct. The Jainas also have criticised its one-sided acceptance.
In fact, this theory of ākstivāda seems to be effort made towards the synthesis of the two trends of Indian tradition, viz. the Naiyāyika and the Grammarian. The Naiyāyikas regard the meaning of the word as the object and the Grammarians to some extent regard it as an image born of understanding. The Jainas in their figure theory (akrtivāda) synthesise the two in such a way that on the one hand the meaning acquires understanding and on the other hand the understood-meaning ceases to be imaginary. It is real because the figure of the image is always of some experienced real object. As far as the nature of the universal is concerned, ākȚtivādais a compromise between nominatism (nāmavāda) and the realism (vastuvāda). It regards that the universal, which is taken as the denotation of word by the Mimāṁsakas, is neither merely a name (mental image) nor as having a real existence independent of the individual or the particular. It is such a mental reflection or image which is created on the basis of similarity or resemblance between different individuals. It is though mental, yet is not imaginary or unreal. The Jainas regard such an image as the denotation of the word. They also believe that, that which is denoted by the image, is a real and particular object. There is a relative similarity