Jaina Philosophy of Language

SR No.: 001601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 2006
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Language
File Size: 10 MB

Page 144

(118) : Jaina Philosophy of Language or 'false' by itself. A statement in English language may be true or false only for the person who knows English but for one who knows only Hindi, it is neither 'true' nor 'false'. The truthfulness or the falsehood of a statement is possible only when the listener is able to comprehend some meaning (the mental image of the object). Thus, there is no linguistic statement, barring tautology and definitions is absolutely true or false. Moreover, the truthfulness/validity or the falsehood/invalidity of a statement is possible in a specific context only. The question of truth-value of a statement
Jaina philosophers have given serious thoughts to the question of the truth-value of a statement. In the Prajñāpanā-sūtra language is divided into two classes viz. (i) Paryāpta-bhāṣā (Developed language) and (ii) Aparyāpta-bhāṣā (Undeveloped language). 'The Paryāpta-bhāṣā (developed language) is that language, the statements of which could be verified as true or false and the statements, which cannot be verified is called as aparyāpta-bhāṣā.* The probable and non-verifiable statements are the characteristics of undeveloped language. Comparatively the verifiable language, the mathematical language and the definitions of Western tradition can be regarded as equivalent to the developed language whereas rest of the linguistic behaviour falls under undeveloped language. There are two categories of developed language viz. (i) Satya-bhāṣā (True language) and (ii) Asatya-bhāṣā (False language). Similarly, there are two categories of undeveloped language also viz. (i) Satya-mrșā (True as well as false) and (ii) Aasatya-amrsā (Neither true nor false or neutral language). True Language
The statements, which denote the real nature of a thing (fact, situation), are called true. The correspondence between the statement and the fact (object or meaning) is the fundamental criterion of truth. The Jaina philosophers, like the Western empiricists, accepted that the more compatible will be the statement to its fact, the more truthful will be the statement. The Jaina philosophers however, do not limit the truth of a statement to its objective verifiability only. The statement could be 'true' besides their empirical verifiability also. The statements, which are not