Jaina Philosophy of Language

SR No.: 001601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 2006
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Language
File Size: 10 MB

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(114) : Jaina Philosophy of Language
coherence theory as Svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda (being established by intrinsic proof). The Jaina philosophers have not taken any one-sided view and regard that the validity of knowledge can be determined intrinsically (svataḥ) as well as extrinsically (parataḥ). They also believe that the criterion of validity lies not in the knowledge itself but in the knowable. Vādidevasūri in his Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokasays that 'the validity of knowledge consists in its agreement with the knowable.' With respect to their origination (i.e. validity and the invalidity of knowledge) are due to the other (something other than the self) while their consciousness is due to itself and the other.' In my opinion, Vādidevasūri's contention that the validly of knowledge can be judged absolutely on the basis of the objects of knowledge or by some other knowledge, is not appropriate. As far as the mathematical knowledge and the case of definitions are concerned, the criterion of knowledge, no doubt, is the internal coherence of knowledge. Similarly, in all that knowledge, where the object of knowledge is not other than the knowledge, its criterion of validity is not to be searched elsewhere; its validity will be intrinsic. In the type of knowledge where there is no subject-object dualism like an omniscient's self-realisation, we will have to accept the origin and validity of knowledge both intrinsically (svataḥ). The knowledge is relatively identical with the knowable e.g. self-perception and in that stage of identity, its origin and validity will be determined intrinsically. In my opinion, in the objective knowledge, we must regard the criterion of validity (origin) and ascertainment (jñapti) intrinsic (svataḥ) as well as extrinsic (parataḥ). When somebody, for example, states that in a certain maternity-home a barren women has given birth to a son, the determination of the invalidity of this statement lies in the very internal incoherence of the statement. It is not to be decided by some other piece of knowledge or extrinsically. Similarly, the definition of triangle, that it is a figure with three arms, depends upon the internal coherence (of the definition). Thus, the criterion of origin and ascertainment of validity and invalidity of knowledge or statement can be determined on the basis of knowledge or the nature of statement intrinsically or extrinsically in both the ways as the case may be.
In the knowledge as a whole (sakala-jñāna), the perfect knowledge (Pūrṇa-jñāna) and the subjective knowledge (ātmagata-jñāna) the