Jaina Philosophy of Language

SR No.: 001601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 2006
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Language
File Size: 10 MB

Page 136

(110) : Jaina Philosophy of Language
(iii) Negation of the expressibility of reality in all the four forms viz. 'sat' (existent), ‘asat' (non-existent), ‘sadasat' (existent as well as non-existent) and 'na sat-na-asat' (neither existent nor non-existent).
(iv) To regard reality as naturally indescribable is fourth view. According to this view reality can be experienced but cannot be expressed in words.
(v) Acceptance of sat and 'asat' both simultaneously but having no mode of expression for such applications, the reality is called indescribable.
(vi) The reality has infinite characteristics but words are limited. There is no word to describe each an every characteristic of the reality. As such, because of the lack of the words the reality is described as partly expressible and partly inexpressible.
Now, the question may be raised as to which of the meanings of 'indescribability' is acceptable to the Jaina tradition. Generally, the Jaina tradition does not accept the first three negative meanings. It also does not accept the application of sat and asat both simultaneously, as a result it regards the reality as indescribable. But, if we consider the old Āgamas, we shall find that this is not the only meaning of 'indescribability'. In the Acaranga-sūtra, the self is stated as 'beyond-words' by nature. It also says that 'there is no word, which can describe that (reality). We have to accept, therefore, that the very nature of reality is such that it cannot be made the object of language in its entirety. Again, on the basis of the infinite characteristics of reality and the limited word-stock, the reality is accepted as indescribable. Acārya Nemicandra has mentioned anabhiläpyabhava in his Gommaṭasāra. He writes, 'it is only the infinitesimal part of the feeling or the experience expressed in words.' 10 This clearly shows that in the Jaina tradition there is only one meaning of indescribability.
Generally, it is the forth, fifth and the sixth meanings of indescribability which are acceptable in Jainism. It may also be noted that the Jaina view accepts the relative indescribability, rather than the absolute indescribability. Jainas are of the opinion that the things are not absolutely describable but at the same time they are also not absolutely