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Anekāntavāda and Bertrand Russell's Doctrine of Perspectives
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reals but "cach real is equally diversified.”] This principle of the multiple nature of reality is known as Anekāntavāda. Each object of knowledge has infinite number of characters (Dharmas) all of which cannot be known by us simultaneously at a time. We look at the object from a particular point of view at a time and hence acquire only a partial knowledge of it. Such partial knowledge about some one aspect or character of the object to the exclusion of innumerable other aspects of it, is called naya. A naya is thus a particular point of view from which an object is looked at. There are innumerable ways or standpoints from which an object can be looked at but a naya represents only one of the many ways or standpoints. This method of standpoints is known as Nayavāda. The whole object cannot be identified with any particular point of view although that point of view is real.
The particular points of view which give us partial knowledge about the object, are expressed in the form of judgments. Each judgment which expresses a particular standpoint about an object is thus also partial and hence relative. This logical expression of Nayavāda is called Syādavāda. Syādavāda reminds us that every judgment or proposition should be qualified by the word syāt which means 'from a certain point of view' or 'in a certain sense'. This leaves the possibility of other alternatives open and does not bind us dogmatically to a single, absolute and unqualified judgment or proposition. Since all judgments are relative, Syādavāda is the expression of Sāpekşvā da as against Nirpekşavāda which is a sort of logical dogmatism. Nayavāda and Syādavāda are thus two important doctrines that result from Anekāntavāda. “Anekāntavāda is the heart of Jaina metaphysics and Nayavāda and Syādavāda (or Saptabhangi) are its main arteries". 2
Anekāntavāda in general and the doctrines of Nayavāda and Syādavāda in particular have great resemblance to Russell's doctrine of perspectives the early exposition of which is found in his Lowell Lectures which he delivered in 1914. According to Russell an object presents many appearances at a moment. These appearances known as sense-data, reveal different aspects of the object in question All these different aspects are real but the object as a whole cannot be identified with any one aspect of it. On the other hand, the object or the 'thing' of common-sense is neutral between different
aspects of it. It is logically constructed out of sense-data. As he Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only
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