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Studies in Indian Philosophy
toʻ-(Fa)'. Similarly, '(Fa) and (Ga)' is equivalent to '(F and G)a' in which F and G' is a compound predicate. The logic of propositions is applicable to the predicate-expressions without involving any inconsistency. But this does not hold good with respect to subject-terms. It has been shown in the following
way :
(1) Fa and Ga (2) --(-(Fa and Ga)) [From (1) by double negation] (3) -(-((F and G)a)) [From (2) by introducing a
conjuctive predicate] (4) -((F and G)ā) [From (3) by introducing a negative
subject] (5) -(Fā and Gā) [Expansion of (4)] (6) -(-(Fa) and -(Ga)) [From (5)] (7) Fa or Ga [From (6)].
Now (1) is not equivalent to (7). So the logic of propo. sitions cannot be applied to the subject-terms. Strawson tries to substantiate the asymmetry between subject and predicate in terms of concepts and particulars. According to him a predicate-term specifies a concept, but a subject-term specifies a particular. Moreover, a concept can be incompatible with another concept or can involve another concept, but a particular cannot have such relations with another particular. This follows from the nature of particulars and concepts. From the nature of a particular it follows that the negation of a subject-term which specifies a particular becomes an ill-formed expression. In the context of Indian theories of negation we shall discuss whether we can negate a name or a subject-expression.
II The aim of this section is to discuss the different types of negation mentioned in the Mimämsā system of philosophy. Since the Mimāṁsā philosophers have emphasised injunctions rather than indicative sentences, they have developed a logic of injunctions. The various types of negation have been discussed in the context of in junctions."
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