Studies in Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 001580
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 352
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Religion
File Size: 21 MB

Page 71

Studies in Indian Philosopby
The insinuation should not be attempted that if darkness and light have this contrary character, it could sometimes happen that darkness overpower light. One should bear in mind that things have their fixed natures—light always overpowers darkness, and not vice versa--for otherwise, just as fire burns cotton-wool, so cotton-wool should burn fire for both are alike opposed to each other.
Therefore, the Nyāya-Vaiśesika should accept, says Vādi. Devasūri, that tamas is not just absence of light, but is a distinct entity.
The author of the Kandali (i.e Sridhara) has put forth a fancy of his own : "Tamas is a particular colour which is superimposed everywhere on there being the complete absence (or negation) of light.5 But he is on the wrong track. In the earlier part of the night on there being the complete absence of light all things without exception - the surface of the ground, etc. which would serve as the substratum of superimposition, are not perceived, and when no such thing is percei. ved, a particular colour could not possibly be superimposed. Yellowness is known to be superimposed only on a conch wbich is perceived. So what Śridbara says cannot be accepted.
This as a matter of fact refutes what has been said against chāyā (shade, shadow) also being regarded as a dravya (subst. ance). The opponent moreover argues that when chāyā is just the absence of light it cannot possibly be another substance, and so if it is apprebended as a substance it is due to an erroneous conception. But it is actually because of the opponents own erroneous conception that he is saying this. If there were anything to contradict chāyā's being a substance, then it would be proper to say that its apprehension as a substance is a false one. Pratyakşa or perception does not contradict its being a substance; on the contrary it is perception which is the direct witness of its being an independent substance. If inference be said to be a contradicting factor, could the inference be as follows : 'Chāyā is of the nature of negation, because it is an effect other than substance, quality or action, or could there be another inference? It could not be the former