Studies in Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 001580
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 352
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Religion
File Size: 21 MB

Page 69

Studies in Indian Philosophy
Moreover, if tamas be the negation of light, it could be the prāg-abhāva (prior negation) or the pradhvaṁsābhāva (posterior negation), or the itaretarābhāva (mutual negation) or the atyantābhāva (absolute negation) of light. Tamas could not be the prior negation of oue light, for it is seen to be destroyed even by the light of the sun as it is destroyed by the light of the lamp. The prāg-abhāva of a thing can be destroyed by that very thing; e.g. the prior-negation of cloth is destroyed by cloth alone. Nor can tamas be said to be the prior negation of a number of lights, for it is seen to be destroyed by one light only, just like the prior negation of cloth (-if it be the prior negation of a number of lights it could be removed by that every number of lights and not by just one).
It may be argued that tamas destroyed by one particular. light is different from the tamas destroyed by another particular light, that is to say, each tamas is the negation of the corresponding counter-entity light, and so even when a particular darkness is destroyed by a lamp or the like, another darkness that can be destroyed by the sun or the like is not destroyed in the absence of the sun or the like, and therefore the reason put forth, viz. 'because darkness is destroyed by one light' is an asiddha (unreal) one.
This argument is not proper. In a place where darkness has been removed by a lamp or the like, the darkness which is capable of being removed by the sun or the like and which is capable of being seen (i.e. is perceptible in character, or amenable to sense-perception) is yet not perceived like any other thing the two parties are in agreement about that if it is amenable to perception and is still not perceived it does not exist. And if tamas were of the nature of prāg-abhāva then on there being the destruction of a series of lamp-flames, there could not be the origination of darkness, for prāg-abhāva is beginningless ( - it has no origination).
Nor could tamas be regarded as of the nature of pradhvuṁsābhāva (posterior negation) of light, for it is destroyed