Studies in Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 001580
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 352
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Religion
File Size: 21 MB

Page 41

Studies in Indian Philosophy
systems, the tenet of Antarābhava was put forward; it is a period of suspension between the moment of death and the moment of conception in the mother's womb. In this period the corrent of life-process flows without any physical support until it is suitably combined.29 The conception of Antarābhava enhances the possibility of suitable combination, for the period during which a combination is formed becomes lengthened.
It is not in the scope of this paper, but we may spare a little space to the trend of Absolutism in the later Buddhist thought of Mahāyāna - Madhyamika and Vijñāna vāda. Through the method of reductio ad absurdum, the Madhyamika showed the absurdities in holding a position of realism or otherwise. The positions of 'is, is not, both is and is not, and neither is or is not' are the categories of knowledge and the Absolute which is not relative to the relative, is not to be known through any of these categories of knowledge and so they do not held any position of their own. For them the Absolute is termed variously as Sūnyatā, Nirvāṇa, etc., is neither different nor identical with Samsāra; the difference between the two lies in looking at things.
To accept the Absolute without nolding a position of one's own, though not lacking in consistency, was feared to lead to a life of inaction in practical life. The Absolute of Mādhyamika was substituted by a sort of subjective idealism in the Vijñānavāda which accepted 'Consciousness only' as the ultimate truth, and as Absolute. The external world is the transformation of the consciousness and this consciousness, when purified to the extent to remain 'Consciousness only', is realisation of Absolute, Nirvana,
Conclusion
Concluding the discussions, we may say that Buddha by denying the existence of soul denuded the phenomena of their metaphysical substratam. He was allergic to the metaphysical speculations because of epistemological difficulties involved and their futility, inconduciveness to the immediate