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21
BHARTRHARI'S PARADOX +
Hans G. Herzberger Radhika Herzberger
Assuming that many things in our experience and in the world can be pamed, one may consider whether there are apy limits to this process, and whether there are any things which caunot be named. This was a standing question in traditlonal Indian philosophy, with some schools of thought affirming that everything could be named while others denied it. The affirmative position was especially characteristic of the Nyāya-Vaiseșika school:1
"Naiyāyikas are found of a saying, wbich is sometimes found at the head of their works; whatever is, is knowable and nameable ".
The negative position was characteristic of the Buddhist philosophers and may have been held by others as well. In its most general terms it may be cast in the form of an existential statement : Unnameability thesis : There are some things which are unnameable.
While it may be surprising and to some extent counter to commonsense, this unpameability thesis pertains to the theory of language and should be suject to rational inquiry. But perplexities arise as soon as one tries to verify it by positive instances, for any positive instance of the unpameability thesis seems bound to name that which it declares to
• We are indebted to Professor K. Kupjunni Raja and Bimal K. Matilal for discussing with us certain problems of translation and exegesis. We are also grateful to the Rishi Vally School and to Vasanta Vihar, Nadies, for their hospitality while this paper was being written; and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its support.
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