Studies in Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 001580
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 352
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Religion
File Size: 21 MB

Page 156

Memory
129
has been copied by several copiests, good or perfect ones and bad ones, is a fake one, i.e., not by one of the masters. Now, nothing will be gained hy looking at the second set of the copies, to investigate whether it is a true replica or not. To resolve the doubt one way or other one has to investigate the first painting. Thus, by making sure that a memory-experience is a correct and "full" revival of a previous act, we do not gain any insight into the problem of deciding whether the original act was a knowing act or not. The problem of an exact remembrance, like the problem of an exact reproduction, is quite separate from the problem of ensuring the first act to be an act of knowing. This analysis, therefore, shows that there is a good reason, not just a terminological dispute, for resisting the inclination to call a memory-experience a knowing act.
What I have argued here can be well supported by quo. ting a passage from Udayana's Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi (p. 110). This passage was Udayana's comment on Vācaspati's rather enigmatic statement in reply to the question why memory-experience is not regarded as a pramā. (Tāt. payaţikā, p. 35);
“The relation between word and object is determined by people's corivention (loka). And people call such cognitive event pramā as is non-promiscuous with the object or fact (artha) and different from such memory-experience as is produced only from mnemonic impression (saņskāra)."
This might have given the impression that it is a matter of arbitrary choice of the language-users that memory is not to be called a pramā. But Udayana sets the matter straight as far, at least, as the Nyāya view is concerned. A pramā is a cognitive awareness that is in accord with the object or fact, but memory can hardly be said to have such an accord, and hence it is not a pramā. I quote:
"Moreover, how can memory-experience be in accord with the object/facts ? For it is not true that when a object SP-17