Studies in Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 001580
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 352
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Religion
File Size: 21 MB

Page 150

Circularity in the inductive justification..
123
there is an excellent non-Indologists' introduction to anumāna by a well-known logician-philosopher.
13 On NCE, see PNT, III, Sūtras 7 and 8. pp. 181 ff, Sūtra 10 and the
commentary in PNT, pp. 192 and 200.
14 Roughly synonymous with udāharana. PNT p. III, 181ff and p. 216.
15 PNT, I discuss this in VI, however, such lack of doubt (samsaya) is
freedom from faulty superimposition (samaropa) PNT, Sūtras 9, 11 and 13, pp. 37-48, with a similar lack of illusion (vipar yāya) PNT, pp. 37ff and inattention (anadh yavasāya ) PNT, p. 48; confidence or certain knowledge (vyavasà ya or nirnaya), PNT, chapter I, is generated, the purpose of which is to allow us to accept the agreeable and discard the disagreeable, PNT, Sūtra 2, pp. 13 and 33 and Sūtra 3, p. 22 and 'agreement with the knowable' (avyabhicaritam prame yam ), Chapter 1, S. 18, p. 73. Thus, removal of doubt yields certainty, that is, v yavasāya and constitutes verifiability.
16
See Part V. Argument. +
3 (p. 183-184).
17 PNT. the legitimacy of pratyaksa (perception) is dependent on the
legitimacy of anumana (inference), pp. 183, 191.
18 PNT, ch. I, Sūtra 19, p. 174.
19 Obviously I did not reverse the order of the parārthanūmäna to con
form to moderm formalistic expectations; that reversal generates certain crucial metalogical difficulties which, altogether not directly relevant here, are detailed in my article Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Description of Buddhist Logic', see note 1. p. 186.
20 PNT. p. 182.
21 '?' is very roughly equivalent, in my simple use here, to the English
if...then," Sanskrit "yat.. tat."
22 P. F. Strawson, An Introduction to Logical Theory (Oxford, 1952), p.
256ff...=ILT.
23 Ibid., 257.
24 But only in most cases, not in all. See my remarks on the restricted
rules of legitimacy and substitution inherent in the fallacies (abhasa ) where there are nonempirical, but logically prior incompatible metaphysical