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Circularity in the inductive justification...
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(parārthānumāna ). Thus arumāna is used to establish the legitimacy of iarka, and iarka is used to establish the legitimacy of anumāna and pratyakşa.1? Consider the following named relationships. Names : A : that percetion (pratyaksa) is legitimate is guaranteed
by inference (anumāna), and V : that anumāna is legitimate is guaranteed by vyapti,
and T: that vyāpti is legitimate is guaranteed by tarka, and N: that tarka is legitimate is guaranteed by NCE
(bādha-varjita). That is, that the vyāpti is legitimate, is claimed only for a finite restricted field-dependent range of possible instances; and with no counter examples, tarka is to be accepted. Therefore, only the lack of counter examples remains relevant as a logically oriented justification. That the argument of NCE is legitimate is justified by appeal to the general rule that if there are NCE and tarka is "consistent ” or “agreeable" with perception, 18 then a specific vyāpti claim is to be accepted. Therefore to justify A, T, V, and N (as just named) one must presuppose (in a different sequeace) all N, T, V, A, and NCE.
Thus : (1) NCE must be held with both anvaya vyāpti (p = q) and vyatireka-vyāpti ( ~qB~p) ( somewhat akin to Mill's joint method of agreement and disagreement), that is, a "pragmatic” justification.
(2) If one has exhaustively investigated the finite range of possible counter example and if one knows that one has done so ( svaprakāśa svasamvedana "self-revelatory knowledge '') then the degree” of one's conviction of certainty can be only as strong as the confidence one has in the exhaustiveness of search for NCE. However, the exhaustiveness for counter examples presupposes : SP-15
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