Studies in Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 001580
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 352
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Religion
File Size: 21 MB

Page 138

Curcularity In the inductive justification...
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in this context is that the necessary authorization for this constitues an inductive generalization from the specific or particular (visesa) to general sāmānya which requires the logically prior establish ment of the legitimacy of the general vyāpti (samanya) relations. Note that this is a general theory, and not a particular one; however, it is always in a particular case where we must utilize the general theory of vyāpti in order to claim the legitimate concomitance of two particular instances, that is, the specific vpāpti. Tarka supplies both these authorizations, The general theory of tarka is then inductive and circular, because the general theory itself presupposes the legitimacy of vyāpti and appeals to the absence of counter examples (NCE) to justify its own general utility (see Part IV). However this consistent use of inductive generalizations should not be considered as a logical theory of inductive logic. For example, there is no explicit concept of probability in tarka as there is in contemporary inductive theory and thus neither entails nor substantiates that the use of tarka constitutes an explicit theory of inductive logic.
4. Specific circularity and the grounds for accepting tarka Now that we have sifted out some of the more obvious intermeshed presuppositions in the purpose and uses of tarka, let us consider the grounds claiming that this procedure is a desirable one on which we can rely. That is, why should we accept that the exhaustive search for counter examples to a specific warrant-dụsļānta is suficient ground for our confidence ? In a nutshell, the Jaina answer regarding this NCE justification is that the absence of counter examples gives us confidence (1) if and only if the search has been exhaustive, and (2) there are no reasonable alternatives. (Remember that the sarvajña and višesa-cum-sāmānya theories constitute independent justifications.)
The Jainas hold that one must have a strong conviction, solid, undoubting confidence that one is right, 15 that is, that one has searched for all instances of counter examples as is