Studies in Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 001580
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 352
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Religion
File Size: 21 MB

Page 112

On reasoning from anvaya...
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body and the property of being a perceiving agent. On the contrary, (2a) holds. Hence, the body cannot be the self. Sureśvara also says the physical body is not the self because it does not continue to occur in a dream, though the perceiving being that dreams continues therein. In other words, were the body and the self the same, (la, b) and (la', b') would hold with them as values. But this is not the case, since there is an instance where the self occurs without the body. Sureśvara gives a similar argument against considering ego-consciousness (aharkāra) a property of the self.17 If this were so, (la, b) would hold with the self and ego-consciousness as values of the variables, so that ego-consciousness would continue to accompany the self in two states : final release and deep dreamless sleep. However, it is accepted that this is not so. Hence, (la) fails to hold in all instances.
Reasoning in this manner, one can see that certain things one might otherwise be led to consider oneself cannot be this. Now, if one says
(12) 318 95427814 'I saw a water pot'. one obviously uses aham with reference to an agent of perception who bas seen an object. On the other hand, upon awakening from a deep dreamless sleep, one can say
(13) ferragcasehajafa a1g19h27 I didn't see anything else at all in this deep sleep'. again using aham, (13) denies that one perceived anything, that one was aware of anything but oneself, in this sleep. However, it does not deny the capacity of seeing (dụsți), the conscious intelligence which is the true constant when one considers oneself.18 This persists in the absence of other things such as ego-consiousness. It is to be accepted that these cannot be the self, since (2a') holds : The self persists even without them. Moreover, these are in a dependency relation with the self : As perceptible entities, they have no statue without it. 19 Thus, this persistent conscious intelligence in and of itself is treated as the true inner self (pratyagātman).