Studies in Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 001580
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 352
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Religion
File Size: 21 MB

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Studies in Indian Philosophy
ānaya. The meaning common 10 (3a, b) is attributed to gām, the one common to (4a,b) is attributed to aśvam : 'cow' and :horse.' In the same manner, one concludes that ānaya, which is found in (3a ), (4a ) but is absent from (3b), (4b), and badhāna, present in the latter but not in the former, respectively mean “bring' and 'teiher! It would not do 10 reach other conclusions from (3), (4), for example, to say that gām means 'bring.' To be sure, part of the meaning of (3a), which has this item, is bring'. However, gām also occurs in (3b), which does not involve this meaning, and ( 4a ) does have this meaning, though it lacks gām. That is, a tentative conlu sion based on (la) alone is refuted, since (2a,b) hold.
From the consistent cooccurrence estabiished by (1), ir is also possible to conclude that certain features are proper to a given thing, which is characterized by these properties. Thus, an ancient could use this reasoning to say that heat and light are properties of fire. 3 In this, connection, consider part of what Sankara says in his Bhāsya on Brahmasūtra 3.3.53-54. At issue is an argument attributed to materialists defending their position that the self (ātman) others say is separate from the body is not really distinct from this. According to these materialists, this self is nothing more than the body qualified by the power of intelligence, which itself is said to result from the modification of the elements cartb, water, fire and wind. Though one does not find such power in these external elements, whether together or si one may say this is found in them when they are modified to form a body, just as one finds intoxicating power in the modified form of juices. The argument supporting this position involves reasoning by (1) to show that properties said to pertain to a self different from the body by those who accept that there is such a distinct self in reality pertain to the body (cf. note 3 ). Life breath, purposeful activity, intelligence, memory etc. should be treated as properties of the body, since they are perceived to be only in a body, not outside it, and a possessor of such properties other than