Study of Tattvarthasutra with Bhasya

SR No.: 001578
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Suzuko Ohira
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1982
Total Pages: 196
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Tattvartha Sutra, Philosophy, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 13 MB

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Sec. 3. SOME PROBLEMS IN THE
literature. Gunadhara takes up kaşāyas in the 7th chapter as constituting upayoga, which is again a new concept. Upayoga is already explaind as the characteristic nature of the soul in the cinon. Th: Bhagavati 12 10.466 reckons the ātmā as of eight kinds, i.e., dravya, kaşāyā, yoga, upayoga, jñāna, darśana, cāritra and virya. Gunadhara seems to have ciught hold of this concept of kaşāya ātmā as the characteristic nature of the samāıi jiva, and expressed kaşāyas in terms of upayoga, the chiracteristic na-ure of the soul. Kundakunda follows the Kašā yaprābhrta on this matter, as he explains, for instance, in the Pravacanasāra II. 63ff. that kaşāyas constitute asuddha upayoga. And the later Digambara authors including Kundukunda seem to have widened the content of upayoga as the source of the conscious activities of wbich expressions take place in the form of threefold yogas of mind, speech and body. In another word, it came to be conceived as the source of cognitive, volitional, emotional and physical activities, or as the source of both conscious and subconscious activities, thus it came to include in its content the psychic attention and the sense reactions of the lower beings.
The canonical literature speaks of upayoga invariably in terms of sākāra-anākāra that are identical with jñāna-darsina, which is considered to be the characteristic nature of the soul. The T. S. II : 8-9 represent this canonical concept of upayoga. The karma specialists understood that jñā nāvaraniya karma categorically differs from darśanāvaraniya karma on the basis of their different nature. However, curiously enough, they did not establish darśanamohaniya karma and caritramohaniya karma as the two independent categories in the class of mūla prakstis. These two mohaniya karmas distinctly differ by nature inasmuch as jñānāvaraniya karma and darśanāvaraộiya karma do, and the former two are related within the context of mohaniya category inasmuch as the latter two are interdependent in the context of upayoga. Nay, the latter two types of cognition share much closer mutual relation than the former two types of delusion because darśana (faith) and caritra belong to entirely different categories. They could have in fact formulated a single category of upayogāvaraniya karma accompanied by the two subdivisions of jñāna and darśana inasmuch as they did for mobaniya karma. The later karma specialists abstracted kşāyika samyaktva as a siddba's guna in the sequel of the eradication of mobar iya karmas. Likewise they could have abstracted ananta upayuga by the destruction of upayogā varaniya karmas. Jhāna and darśana are identical-cum-different within the category of upayoga consisting of sākāra and anākāra types. Therefore if these two ävaraniya karmas were made in one in the form of upayogā varaniya karma, our problem in question would not have cropped up. The abbedavāda expressed by Siddhasena Divākasa seems to be perfectly logical in grasping the nature of the problem.
A catalogue of kırma prakstis was completed by the time of Umāsvāti. And the table of the g asthā 13 wis nearing to completion by the end of the Āgamic age.
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