Traverses on Less Trodden Path of Indian Philosophy and Religion

SR No.: 001577
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1991
Total Pages: 302
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 20 MB

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Traverses on less tradden path...
Vedaotins can be understood in three alternative ways :--absolute nonexistenco, mistake or one thing appearing as another and indescribable. The first two meanings are denied by the Vedantins because, the former view leads to asatkhyāti, which is accepted by some Buddhists and latter view is Viparitakhyāti, which involves two reals: the thing which is mistaken and the thing as it is mistaken. The third alternative that it means 'indescribability' is also not plausible because everything has corresponding expression for it in language, for instance, 'this is a table', 'this is a sarala tree' etc. and what gives birth to an expression in language is either an object or a piece of knowledge. Again, an object must be either real or upreal; to deny both the alternatives to a thing is meaningless, only one of them can be denied. If indescribability of thing means ' niņsvabhāvariva (i.e. unsubstantial) i.e. it is not what it appears to be, than it leads to viparitakhyati. If it is understood in the sense of un-knowability, then the very argument that a thing is un-substantial because it is unknowable indicates that the thing is not absolutely un-knowable. And again, this apparent world eannot be, talked about due to unknowability and it cannot be made the subject of the syllogism such as the world is unreal, because it is an apparent reality', etc. If the world is un-knowable, then it could not be predicated of the world. Thus, unknowability is inconsistent with the hetu i.e. prati yamanarva. If unknowability means that a thing is not really as it appears to us, then it cannot be said as un-knowable, because, here, a thing is known differently from what it is, which is again principle of Viparitakh yati, un-acceptable to Vedāntins. Even direct perception of plurality of thing of the world such as "Table', 'Chair'. Sarala tree' etc. disapproves the doctrine of indescribability of the world. 58
This doctrine of unreality of the world of Advaitins can be refuted by providing counter arguments such as "world is not false, because it is different from a non-existing thing, that which is different from nonexisting thing is not false, as for instance the soul, this world is so. bence, it is not false”.56 This counter argument makes it very clear, that. it is irrational to accept the Vedantins view that the soul which appears as a reality in our apprehension is only real and other things are unreal which also appear as real in our apprehension. If it is said that inference proves the unreality of the world then, it can be argued that "Is syllogism
55. n) R. K. P. 34-35
(b) s. M. P. 78-79. (a) B. K. P, 34-35. (b) S. M. P. 80,