Jainism Some Essays

SR No.: 001374
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: A S Gopani
Publisher: Prakrit Bharti Academy
Publication Year: 1986
Total Pages: 156
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 11 MB

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Jainism
fact that according to him effort, and not fate, is the strong factor responsible for a person's final freedom. It is left entirely to the will of thc person whether he wants to get into or out of the Karmic entanglements. If at all the Bhavya want to be free from them, there is no power on carth that can deter him from doing so. What else is this, if not endeavourism ? This is fully illustrated by the life of Mahā vira himself and his teachings. Relative form of all the things--sentient and non-sentient.
The varieties, divisions and subdivisions of the beings are selfevident. But if they all are identical by nature and if they all have potentiality to be a like in emancipated condition, what is it that is responsible for all the differences and disparities? It has been said that Karma is the causative factor or agent. Philosophers have variously explained as to how the soul and the Karmas come into contact, how the soul acquires different forms and shapes by its simply coming into company with the Karmas and how the worldly relationships are forged and fostered. Amongst all these explanations, Jain explanation is typical and is known as Anekānta.
According to certain philosophers, the soul does not undergo any change, even the least, when it comes into contact with the Karmas. Soul is eternal. Whatever modifications are found in it, they are merely the progeny of the non-setient Prakrti which is fast adhering to the soul. The properties such as the knowledge etc. belong to the Prakrti and not to the soul. Pra becomes dissociated from the soul and the soul becomes free at the moment when the knowledge about their totally disparate nature dawns in a being. The bondage and emancipation are the two phenomena concerned with Praksti and not with Puruşa on which they are wrongly imposed. Puruşa is eternal and does not undergo any modificatory changes. But there are other philosophers also who, holding opposite views, have pronounced that there is nothing like the samsāra or the emancipation, that the soul is not eternal, that the soul is born out of the mixing and inter mixing of the inert matter and that it dies along with the body when it dies. When this is the position where does the samsāra come in, they add ? And when there is no samsāra, emancipation is out of question. While facing these two sets of views, Mahāvira took up the essential features from both of them and incorporated the same in his famous doctrine of Anekānta. He foresaw that there was no possibility of any modificatory change, worth the name, in the soul if it is entirely eternal and nothing else and nothing more. It is no use saying that
the modificatory changes which are visible and which, it is experienced - do not belong to the soul. Where is the necessity of postulating
totaly independent existence of such a Puruşa as remains a mere spectator when as a matter of fact that the non-sentient Prakrti becomes active only for the sake of Puruşa ? It, thus, becomes imperative to hypothe