Some Problems in Jaina Psychology

SR No.: 001260
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Karnatak University Dharwar
Publication Year: 1961
Total Pages: 205
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 13 MB

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later, in order to bring the Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems of Indian thought, they modified their conception of pratyakṣa and parokṣa jñāna. In the Anuyogadvāra Sūtra, we find a change in terminology. Mati and śruta began to be called pratyakṣa as they were possible through the operation of the sense. organs. Jinabhadra calls the two saṁvyavahāra pratyakṣa.5 Alongside Darśana of jñāna, we have direct intuition of the object. It is darśana. has similar subdivisions. In the same way, wrong knowledge is also possible in those cases where the veil of karma is not removed and where there is perversity of attitude. Thus, we have mati-ajñāna, śruta-ajñāna, and avadhi-ajñāna. The general classification of knowledge and intuition mentioning their perversities, is shown in Table VII. This classification shows that the Jainas believed that the subsidence and destruction of the veil of karma is a necessary condition of knowledge and intuition. Wrong knowledge is characterized as samsaya (doubt), viparyāya (perversity), and anadhyavasaya (wrong knowledge caused by carelessness and indifference). Owing to the lack of discrimination between thereal and the unreal, the soul with wrong knowledge, like the lunatic, knows things according to its own whims. Perversity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledge, and knowledge becomes vitiated. It becomes ajñāna.6
Pratyakṣa
SOME PROBLEMS IN JAINA PSYCHOLOGY
We may now consider sense perception or pratyakṣa jñāna, as the Nandisutra calls it. It is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sense organs and the manas. It was called paroksa by Umäsväti. Jinabdhara called it samyyavahāra pratyakṣa. It is also called indriya pratyakṣa." In the Nandisutra, a distinction is made within pratyakṣa, between perception (indriya pratyakṣa), and perception not due to the sense organs (unindriya pratyakṣa).8 Hemacandra describes in the Pramāṇamīmāmsā that pratyakṣa is that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He analyses the various definitions of pratyakṣa of other schools and shows that they are not adequate. The Naiyayika definition of perception as unerring cognition which is How can the produced by the sense object contact is not adequate. sense object contact and the like, he asks, which is not of the nature of cognition, function as efficient instrument for the determination of the object? The Buddhists have given a definition of perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual construction and is not erroneous.
5 Tattvärthasutra, I. 9-12. Anuyogadvāra Sutra, p. 194. Nandisutra, 4.
6
Ibid.
7 Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya, 95; Nandisutra
8 Nandisutra. For this discussion also refer to Tattertha Sutra I, II and its Bhāṣya.
32. Pañcästikäyasara, 47.