Some Problems in Jaina Psychology

SR No.: 001260
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Karnatak University Dharwar
Publication Year: 1961
Total Pages: 205
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 13 MB

Page 50

THE JAINA THEORY OF UPAYOGA
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the imperfect jīvas there is no simultaneity of occurrence of jñāna and darśana. An imperfect being in the mundane existence cannot experience jñāna and darśana at the same time. There is no agreement among philosophers. Philosophers following the āgamic literature maintain that there is simultaneous occurrence of jñāna and darśana even in the case of the kevalin, because Jñāna and darśana are both conscious experiences, and as such cannot occur at the same moment of experience even in the case of the kevalin much less in the case of the beings in the mundane existence, the saṁsārins.13 In the Višeşāvaśyakabhāsya we get a similar view. Here Jinabhadra says that it is not true to say that when the veil of karma is removed the omniscient soul gets the two experiences simultaneously, because both of them are essentially conscious experiences.14 Umāsvāti maintains that in the case of the mundane souls jñāna and darśana as conscious mental states manifesting themselves in mati, śruta and avadhi occur one after the the other and not simultaneously. But in the case of the omniscient, where there is ‘pure knowledge' and 'pure intuition', there is simultaneous occurrence of the two experiences.15 Kundakundācārya is also of the same opinion. In the case of the kevalin the two experiences occur simultaneously even as the light and the heat of the sun.16 Pujyapāda Devanandi gives a similar view. Akalanka and Vidyānandi support the simultaneous occurrence of jñāna and darśana in the kevalin. If they were to occur successively, his omniscience would only be a contingent occurrence.17 There are some philosophers who do not make any difference between jñāna and darśana at the highest level. They advocate the identity between the two. Haribhadra mentions that the 'old Ācāryas' held the non-difference of the jñāna and darśana.18 As pointed out by Tatia, it is difficult to determine who the old Ācāryas referred to were 19 Siddhasena Diväkara points out that we can distinguish between jñāna darśana up to the point of manahparyāya-jñāna, but at the level of the kevala jñāna there is no difference between jñāna and darśana in the case of the omniscient. If the omnicient soul knows all in an instant, he should continue to know for ever, otherwise he does not know at all. He also says that darśana is jñāna of external objects untouched by or unamenable to the sense organs. But the cognition does not cognize past and future events by means of a linga.20 Yasovijaya sums up the discussion on this problem with the remark that philosophers looked at the problem from different points of view. Therefore,
13 Bhagavatisūtra, VIII, 8. Prajnā panāsūtra, pada 30. 14 Viseşāvasyakabhāsya 3093. 3096. 15 Tattvärthasūtrabhäsya, I. 31. 16 Niyamasura, 159. 17 Aştašati on Aptamimārsū, 101. 18 Nandisutra vrtti, p. 52. 19 Tatia: Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 79. 20 Sanmatitarakaprakarana, II, 3.