Some Problems in Jaina Psychology

SR No.: 001260
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Karnatak University Dharwar
Publication Year: 1961
Total Pages: 205
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 13 MB

Page 48

THE JAINA THEORY OF UPAYOGA
other names, like the will to live, élan vital, the life urge and the libido' Horme under one form or another has been the fundamental postulate of Lamarck, Butler, Bergson and Bernard Shaw. McDougall took great pains to present the hormic theory of psychology as against the mechanistic interpretation of life and mind.
The hormic force determines experience and behaviour. We get conscious experience because of this drive. The conscious experience takes the form of perception and understanding. Horme operates even in the unconscious behaviour of lower animals. In the plants and animals we see it operate in the preservation of organic balance. In our own physical and mental life we find examples of horme below the conscious level. We circulate our blood, we breathe and we digest our food, and all these are the expressions of the hormic energy. It operates at all levels both in the individual and the racial sense. 5 But the horme expressed and presented by the Jaina philosophers could not be developed and analysed in terms of the modern psychology, because their analysis of upayoga was purely an epistemological problem tempered with metaphysical speculation. They were aware of the fact that there is a purposive force which actuates and determines experience. This is clear from the distinction between jñāna and darśana as two forms of upayoga.
Jñana and Darsana
As already pointed out, the Jainas make a distinction between anākāra and sākāra upayoga. They say that anākāra upayoga (indeterminate cognition) is darśana; and sākāra upayoga is jñāna. Sākāra upayoga is specific cognitions and cognizes the specific qualities of the objects. The anākāra upayoga is indeterminate and undistinguished. It is general cognition. It may be called the knowledge of acquaintance, in the language of William James.
The distinction between the indeterminate and the defined cognition, (the sākāra and anākāra upayoga), has been a great problem in the Jaina theory of cognition. It is an ancient problem which has its roots in the early distinction between the two types of karma, jñānāvaraṇīya and darśanāvaraṇīya. The Āgamas make a clear distinction between jñāna and darśana. Kundakundācārya makes a distinction between the two, both from the empirical and the transcendental point of view. He says that the ātman, its knowledge (jñāna), and intuition (darśana) -all these are identical, and they reveal the self as well as the non-self. 7 However,
6 Ross (James S.) : Groundwork of Educational Psychology, p. 47. 6 Prajñapancisutra, pada 29-30.
Vibesīvasyakabhâsya; ākära visega. Abhidhānarājendra, Vol. II. p. 760. 7 Niyamasära, 170.
Tatia : Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 73.