Some Problems in Jaina Psychology

SR No.: 001260
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Karnatak University Dharwar
Publication Year: 1961
Total Pages: 205
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 13 MB

Page 140

OTHER SOURCES OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
forward, for instance, to prove the non-eternity of sound, the counterproposition is asserted and denied by means of the statement.77 However, Bhadrabahu says that the number of propositions in a syllogism depends on the calibre of the person to whom it is addressed. Accordingly, it may be a ten-membered syllogism or a five-membered syllogism. Neither of these alternatives need be rejected. 'We reject neither'.78 In the Pramaṇamīmāṁsā, Hemacandra describes the nature of the five propositions constituting a syllogism.79 Bhadrabahu's contention that the extent of the constituent propositions depends on the ability of the persons to whom it is addressed, has great psychological importance. It implies that the inference is limited by the capacity of the individual's understanding of the argument presented. Siddhasena Diväkara mentions five members in a syllogism. However, Das Gupta says that, regarding inference, the Jainas hold that it is not necessary to have five propositions in a syllogism. It is only the first two propositions that actually enter into the inferential process. (vide Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, pp. 108-109.). When we make an inference, we do not proceed through the five propositions. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining a matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference.80
Aristotle's syllogism is a purely formal and deductive form of inference. We have seen that, in Indian thought, a distinction between deductive and inductive inference is not made. An inference in Indian thought is both formally and materially true. Aristotle's syllogism begins with the major premise, and then it proceeds to apply the universal proposition to a particular case. According to the Jainas and also in all Indian thought, we first get the pratijñā or the proposition to be proved. From the psychological point of view, we do not, in fact, proceed in Aristotle's way. We do not begin with the universal propsition and then apply the universal proposition to a particular case, unless it is to be a deliberate form of reasoning formally presented. It would be psychologically correct to say that we first begin by stating what is to be proved, and then find reasons to prove it. Aristotle's syllogism has more of a logical than a psychological status. W. E Johnson says that it is commonly supposed that premises are propositions first presented in thought,. and that the transition from these to the thought of the conclusion is the last step in the process. 'But, in fact, the reverse is usually the case, that is to say, we first entertain in thought the proposition that is technically called the conclusion and then proceed to seek for other propositions which would justify us in asserting it.
77 Radhakrishnan (S.): Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 81.
78 Daśavaikälika-Niryukti, 50. As quoted in Pramanamimämsä, I, 9. 79 Pramāņamīmāṁsā, Book II, 1 to 15.
80 Das Gupta: History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 185.
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