Some Problems in Jaina Psychology

SR No.: 001260
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Karnatak University Dharwar
Publication Year: 1961
Total Pages: 205
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 13 MB

Page 132

OTHER SOURCES OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
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belief is true and becomes an effective guide to action. In this he includes inductive reasoning also. In the most striking cases, the new belief is derived from a complex chain of processes from a previously established belief: as when the astronomer Adams arrived at the belief that a hitherto unseen planet would be seen at a certain position in the heavens if a sufficiently powerful telescope were directed to that spot 50 Some modern psychologists have tried to reduce the whole thinking process to neural activity. They have made it implicit talking. But this problem is not relevant to our purpose.
Inference has been distinguished from perception. It cannot be identified with perception, although both are equally valid sources of empirical knowledge. Perception is independent of any previous knowledge, while inference depends on previous perception. It is sometimes defined by the Naiyāyikas as knowledge which is preceded by perception. It is based on the perception of the relation between the middle and the major term as subsisting in the minor term. Secondly, perception is due to the contact of the sense organs with an object. Hence, perception is limited to the cognition of the present. But in inference it is possible to get knowledge of the past and future in addition to the knowledge of the present. Perception, therefore, is direct immediate knowledge, while inference is mediate knowledge. Hemacandra says that perceptual cognition arises out of the datum present to the senses. It is incapable of taking cognizance of what has preceded and what is to follow. Therefore, it cannot discern a characteristic capable of determining the validity or invalidity of the individual cognitions occurring before and after. Similarly, it is not possible by means of perception to have acquaintance with what passes in other people's minds.51 Udyotakara mentions this point when he makes a distinction between perception and inference. Perception is confined to objects of the present time and within the reach of the senses, while inference relates to past, present and future.52 Perception and experimental observation do involve an element of inference in that the perceived element is interpreted. Samkara says that where perception is available inference has no place.53 Buddhists made another distinction between perception and inference. For them, perception gives, though inexpressible in words, the peculiar character, (svalakṣaṇa) of the momentary object, while inference deals with ideal generality (sāmānya laksaņa). But the Naiyāyikas do not accept this distinction. For the Naiyāyikas, perception gives us knowledge of the individual in its concrete detail as well as its generality, while -in inference
50 McDougall (W.): Outline of Psychology, p. 402. 51 Pramānamimārsā, I, 1, 11 and Commentary. 52 Nyāya Varttikā, II, 1, 31. 53 Radhakrishnan (S.): Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 73,