Some Problems in Jaina Psychology

SR No.: 001260
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Karnatak University Dharwar
Publication Year: 1961
Total Pages: 205
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 13 MB

Page 130

OTHER SOURCES OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
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The meaning of inference has been a difficult problem in Indian thought, though there has been general agreement on the essential nature of inference. The Jainas say that inference is mediate know ledge. It is knowledge obtained through some other knowledge. Hemacandra says that inference is the knowledge of the major term on the strength of the knowledge of the middle term.44 The Jainas hold that anumāna is the process of knowing an unperceived object through the perception of a sign and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with that object. It is called anumāna because it is the organ of subsequent (anu) cognition (māna). The knowledge of the major term which is of the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact and which arises from a middle term either observed or expressly stated, is called inference. It is really cognition which takes place subsequent to the apprehension of the middle term and the recollection of the necessary relation of the major term and the middle term. 45 In the Jaina Tarkabhāṣā, a definition of inference as given in the Pramānamīmaṁsā is mentioned. The Nyāya system has worked out an elaborate system of inference. It is primarily a study of inference. Võtsyāyana, in his exposition of the process of reasoning described by Gautama, asserts that the process of reasoning is extremely subtle, hard to understand and only to be understood by one of much learning and ability. Keith says that the admission of such a nature is important, because it shows how difficult were the first steps of understanding the process of reasoning.46 Anumāna, literally, means knowledge which follows from some other knowledge. It is knowledge of an object due to the previous knowledge of some sign, linga.47 The previous knowledge is the knowledge of the sign which shows the universal relation between the major and the middle term. Anumāna has been defined by the Naiyāyikas as knowledge of an object not by direct perception but by means of the knowledge of a linga, or sign, which expresses the relation between the major and the middle term. Bhāsarvajña defines inference as a means of knowing a thing beyond the range of senses through its inseparable connection with another thing which lies within the range of senses. Gangesa defines inference as knowledge which is produced by some other knowledge. The object of inference is the knowledge of some fact which follows from the knowledge of some other fact. By means of anumāna we want to know that which may not be perceived but which is indicated by previous perception. For instance, anumāna leads to the knowledge of a hill having a fire on the basis of the perception of the smoke on the hill.48
44 Pramānamimāṁsā, I, 2, 7. 45 Ibid and Commentary. 46 Keith (B.): Indian Logic and Atomiem, p. 85. 47 Nyāyabhāsya I, 1, 3, 1. 48 Chatterjee (S. C): The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, Ch. IX, p. 253.