Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism

SR No.: 001213
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 314
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 18 MB

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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
of Primordial Matter (Parkṛti) in the Spirit (Purusa) and of the latter in the former is evidently an admitted fact, and this necessitates the postulation of the first type of non-existence. Thus, non-existence cannot be denied by the Sankhya without stultifying the whole scheme of ontology propounded by him. But the Sankhya might maintain that the denial of non-existence on his part does not entail these consequences. He does not believe in the reality of non-existence apart from and independent of the reals as the Vaiseşika does. The denial of non-existence thus amounts to the negation of independent non-existence. But if non-existence be regarded as a formative element in the nature of reals he would have no objection to its reality with all its four varieties. But this is also the position of the Jaina and of the Mīmāmsists. If, however, such be the position of the Sankhya and the Mimämsist, they should no longer characterize reals as existent only. Things, on the contrary, should be characterized as existent-and-non-existent. What the Jaina objects to is the uncritical, simple characterization of reals in terms of existence as opposed to non-existence. The nature of reals is always a complex of existence-cum-non-existence. As regards the affirmation of non-existence as a separate and independent category by the later exponents of Vaiseṣika philosophy, the Jaina, too, does not subscribe to it. According to the Jain non-existence is as much an element in the constitution of a real as existence is. Accordingly a real can be said to exist or not to exist. The predication of existence and non-existence in respect of the same subject, though under different circumstances, is proof of the dual nature of reals.
But the aforementioned consequences of the denial of nonexistence would not affect the validity of the position of the Vedäntist. The Vedantist denies all differences and distinctions. The plurality is only an illusory appearance called into existence by the inherent nescience of individual selves. There is no plurality of selves either. The difference between self and non-self is also a fiction. But the question may be legitimately posed to the Vedäntist: 'How would you establish your position? You deny all differences, but by what instrument of knowledge would you substantiate your denial ? Certainly not by perception, nor by inference, nor by scripture, as all these instruments