Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism

SR No.: 001213
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 314
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 18 MB

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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
the head of error were not due to an objective common character possessed by each one of them, there would be no justification for regarding them all as erroneous. Thus the very attempt to dismiss the cognition of a universal as false ends in the affirmation of a real universal. In fact even the false cognition of universal is possible on the basis of a true cognition. Not only this, even error as such has been found to be impossible without the admission of a veridical universal.
As regards the analogy of several universals which are referred to by the same name and concept. viz., universal, that also does not afford any advantage to the Buddhist. Though the universals do not admittedly possess a higher universal, the sameness of reference is not ungrounded in an objective character. In fact, the latter is the proof of an objective common character possessed by all the universals. The common character in question may be defined as the character of existing in all the individuals of a class without existing in the individuals of other classes. This common character is not a universal but that does not argue that it is not objective. In fact, it is admitted by the Naiyayika that there are two types of common character (sāmānya), viz. (1) universal (jāti) and (2) non-universal (upādhi). The Buddhists have sought to explain the unitive reference of individuals on the analogy of that of universals as unfounded in an objective universal. But the explanation could be accepted if the Buddhist could point to the existence of an objective common character in the individuals which the universals have been shown to possess.
Let us again take a retrospect of the results attained. The Buddhist's hypotheses that the universal is a fiction or a subjective construction have been shown to be unsatisfactory. The third hypothesis that it is the individual, which gives rise to the conception of a universal, has just been examined and found to be inadequate. Let us now examine the objections that have been advanced by the Buddhist against the possibility of an objective universal.
1. vastutaḥ sāmānyeṣv api taditarāvṛttitve sati sakalatadvṛttitvamupādhisāmānyam ekam asti, ATVS, p. 390.