Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism

SR No.: 001213
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 314
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 18 MB

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We have alluded more than once to the oneness of inherence in all its incidences. But why should it be one and why should it not vary with the terms as does conjunction on your hypothesis ? The Vaiseșika answers as follows. Inherence is on a par with being. Being is one in all existents. Though the number of existents is infinite, nobody thinks their being to be diffe numerically or qualitatively. The reason for the belief in a selfidentical being is that it is perceived to be the same and that no difference is felt in any regard. On the contrary, if being were to differ in each case, the plurality of things would not be referred to by the same concept and the same expression, viz., being. A plurality of beings, on the other hand, would make the postulation of a higher universal necessary. But as this higher universal would itself be a being, that would only add to the number of beings and would itself remain unsynthesized with the rest of beings. But the synthesis of the different types of being is necessary for logical thought, as they are all referred to by the concept being'. The result of the attempted synthesis would be a regressus ad infinitum as a higher and a higher being were to be postulated. The same considerations apply to the case of inherence. Inherence is felt to be the same in all its incidences and though the terms vary from case to case the notion of inherence is not felt to be different. The concept of ‘in-ness' is everywhere the same, be it a case of inherence of the whole in the parts, or that of a quality in a substance, or of a universal in a particular. Nor can the character of its being a relation be regarded as the ground of its diversity, since there is no necessary connection between relation and diversity. That it is a relation is the proof of its difference from other types of existents, e.g., substance, quality and so on, and not of its difference from other types of inherence. The analogy of the plurality of conjunctions does not apply to inherence. The numerical difference of conjunctions is not proved by the fact of their being relations. Conjunction is perceived in succession in the terms and that constitutes its numerical difference. That in spite of their numerical difference they are referred to by the same
1. na ca 'sya samyogavan nānătvam, iheti-pratyayāviśeşāt, višesalingăbhāvāc ca ... na ca sambandhatvam eva viśeșalingam asyā ’nyathāsiddhatvāt. NKC, p. 296.