Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism

SR No.: 001213
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 314
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 18 MB

Page 221

Relations
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the notion of 'A is in B' demands an objective relation. In the third place, the terms are related as content and container (adhāryādheyabhūta). In the fourth place, the terms so related are found to be inseparable (ayutasiddha). When these conditions are found to be present, the postulation of a relation is nccessary, and as the relation in question differs in fundamental respects from other types of relation, it must be distinct and different from them. The functional and numerical difference of the relation requires a separate name and so it is called in herence (samavāya). It is obvious that it is not a case of nomenclature, pure and simple. The notion of A is in B (ihedampratyayahetu) does not give insight into the character of inherence in full. A man perceives a park and a village together from a distance, though the two are separated and there is a gap between them as a matter of fact. In such a situation the trees are perceived to be situated in the village. The notion of the trees as existing in the village does not justify the supposition of a relation as it is due to the failure of observation of the actual gap between them. But inherence cannot thus be accounted for, as it is a real relation, not due to non-observation of gap. It is, therefore, necessary that it should be clearly stated as being a relation. The first part of the first condition and the second condition are thus logically justified, and as
egards the unity of the relation it will be justified later. The third condition is necessary to exclude such cases as “The bird is in the sky'. There is a relation, viz., conjunction, between the bird and the sky, but it is not inherence, as it is not a relation of container and content. The sky is nothing but space and the bird is not only upon space, but space is also upon the former. The relation is not thus one of container and content, as it is not a relation of up and down. The container is always below the content and the latter is always up on the former. The three conditions are satisfied by the case of a fruit in a basket, but it is a case of conjunction (samyoga) and not inherence (samavāya). To exclude such a case the fourth condition is laid down as an essential characteristic of inherence. The fruits and the basket are not inseparable. To be separable' means that the terms may exist in different loci and may remain out of relation. But this is never found to be the case so far, as the relation of whole and parts (avayavāvayavin), quality and substance (guna-dravya), motion