Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism

SR No.: 001213
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 314
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 18 MB

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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
of material bodies is devised to account for the emergence of such bodies and not to repudiate the reality of the latter.
Let us now examine the grounds adduced by the Buddhist for the repudiation of relation one by one. The Buddhist asserts that relation is not possible between two independent entities. Relation presupposes dependence of one term upon another, but this is impossible between terms which are possessed of existence in their own right. And as regards a term or terms which are not in existence, they too cannot be supposed to depend upon one another, for dependence is a factual relation which cannot be thought to obtain between non-entities.1 So relation is not logically justifi
and as such must be regarded as appearance. The Buddhist position has been summed up by Bradley, who independently reaches the same conclusion, in the following forceful words :
The conclusion to which I am brought is that a relational way of thought — any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations -- must give appearance, and not truth. It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible." The Jaina refuses to be convinced by such flourish of abstract logic.
The factuality of relation is attested by experience. Things in spite of their difference may transform themselves into a unity. It is a fact that things are dynamic and they maintain their identity in spite of their change, in so far at least as their nature is thought to unfold itself to our consciousness. If our intellect is not to be condemned to confusion and bankruptcy and if reality be not declared to be an unfathomable mystery, we must find an explanation. But why should we be sceptic of our knowledge ? We have elucidated the Jaina standpoint in logic in the first chapter and we need not go over the ground again. Suffice it to say that the denial of validity of experience ends in scepticism, entire and unqualified. If, however, we are to believe the testimony of our experience and if we feel called upon to give
1. pāratantryar hi sambandhaḥ, siddhe kå paratantrată ? paråpekşå hi sambandhaḥ, so 'san katham apeksate ? samś ca sarvanirāśańso bhavaḥ katham apeksate ? NKC, pp. 305-06.
2. Appearance and Reality, p. 28.