Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism

SR No.: 001213
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 314
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 18 MB

Page 197

The Dialectic of Sevenfold Predication
175
This constitutes evidence of the truth of the synthesis of opposites, which the Jaina propounds to be the universal truth.
As regards the Buddhists of Dignāga's school, who are the loudest in their protestations of the inviolability of the Law of Contradiction, they, too, are constrained to admit the validity of non-absolutism in exceptional cases. In the perceptual cognition of variegated colours in a carpet, the unity of the content quâ a carpet and the plurality quâ colours are admitted to be present together. Besides, the plurality of contents of the cognition and the unity of the cognitive act are affirmed to belong to a self-identical situation. The confession of the unity of the plurality is only an unconscious tribute to Jaina standpoint and if it is construed as corroboration of non-absolutism by the Jaina, we cannot accuse the latter of dogmatic zeal. The Sautrantika and the Yogacāra believe in the plurality of powers of a single entity and this is an admission of the synthesis of plurality in one -- which is the characteristic Jain position.
The Cārvāka materialist holds consciousness to be thepro duct
four elements, earth, air, water and fire. The product is not numerically different from the elements, as that would make it a separate principle; nor is it identical severally with each, as in that case even jars and tables would possess spirit. It is thus one and the four at the same time. This is only a confirmation of anekāntavāda. The affinities of Mimārsist logic and ontology with the Jaina theory are too pronounced to be ignored. The Mimāmsist believes in the dual nature of reals, constituted by being and non-being as elements, and is thus at one with the Jaina. The later Vaişņava philosophers, who believe in unity and plurality both and in their ultimate synthesis, cannot but endorse the Jaina logical standpoint. As regards the Prabhākara school of Mimämsä, it also has to fall back on non-absolutist logic on occasions. One instance will suffice. According to Prabhakara all cognitions are cognisant of three elements, the content, the act of cognition (that is to say, their own identity), and the self as the knower. Accordingly all cognitions are held to be judgments by him of the form 'I know this.' The synthesis of three in one constitutes an endorsement of the Jaina logical standpoint. The purpose of this long schedule of affinities with other schools of thought is to show that the doctrine of the manifoldness of truth