Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism

SR No.: 001213
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 314
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 18 MB

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The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism
philosophers will sink their differences and profess one philosophy. Philosophy is not so much a question of conviction or carrying conviction as it is a question of mental attitude and outlook of thought and habit of thinking. It will be therefore better and more consonant with truth to say that the task of philosophers is rather conversion than logical conviction. The phenomenon of rival schools of thought holding contradictory views and constantly fighting with one another, however unphilosophical it may appear, will not be a thing of past history, because the fundamental attitudes of mind, the bias of our thought movement, cannot be changed or destroyed."1
We have already alluded to the truth that the differences among realists are no less fundamental with regard to the interpretation of experience and thought. The Jaina deduces the conclusion that a real is constituted of being and non-being from the determinate nature that it possesses. The Naiyāyika also believes that existents are determinate, but declines to accept non-being as a factor of reality. The Naiyayika believes in the opposition of being and non-being like the idealist and hence does not agree with the Jaina in respect of his assertion that reals are existent-cum-non-existent. It is contended by him, "The proposition 'A' is not 'B' or 'A' has not being as 'B' does not admit of the construction that 'A' has non-being of 'B' as an element of its being, which is the Jaina conclusion. The negation of 'B' relates to 'B' and not to 'A'. The proposition 'A' is not 'B' or 'A' has not the being of 'B' cannot be regarded as the equivalent of the proposition 'A' is not. What we seek to establish is that the identity of 'B' is absent in 'A' just as we assert non-existence of jar on the ground. The 'negation' is a determination of the jar and not of the ground and the legitimate form of assertion is 'the jar does not exist on the ground' and not 'The ground does not exist.' Similarly we should assert 'B' does not exist (in 'A') and not 'A' does not exist.' But the second proposition of the sevenfold predication just takes this illegitimate form."
The contention of the Naiyāyika seems to have much plausibility, but it will not stand scrutiny. The non-existence of the
1. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, pp., 93-94..