Jaina Philosophy of Non Absolutism

SR No.: 001213
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Satkari Mookerjee, S N Dasgupta
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 314
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, B000, & B025
File Size: 18 MB

Page 133

The Inexpressible or the Indefinite
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co-equal facts. It is proved by irrefutable logic that being and non-being are the attributes of all entities, and that being so, the conclusion is inevitable that all entities are inexpressible by a single expression, which we have found no reason to repudiate by our examination of the nature and powers of words. We shall discuss the concept of inexpressibility further in Chapter VI and there we will show that the concept is not a mere logical or verbal characteristic, but an ontological attribute, which is different and distinct from existence and non-existence severally and jointly,
Let us examine the meaning of the term 'inexpressible,' which is the predicate of the fourth proposition. It cannot be maintained that the term signifies a real determined by the two co-equal attributes, existence and non-existence, as simultaneously present in it. For the assertion would be tantamount to the repudiation of the Jaina position that such a real is not capable of being expressed by single word or a single concept. But if the word
inexpressible' could express this very attribute, there would be no sense in the advocacy of the concept. Moreover, if the word 'inexpressible' could express the compresence of the positive and negative attributes with co-equal status, the thing would not be inexpressible. And if the word inexpressible could be invested with such a power by a fiat of will, we do not see any logic in the denial of this prerogative to any other word. If it is admitted that any other word would only express the two attributes in succession owing to the limitation of human language and logical thought alike, we cannot conceive how the word 'inexpressible, can be in a privileged position in this regard. If the word be regarded as an abbreviated formula for the two attributes having a co-ordinate status, it must be admitted that it can convey the two attributes as two and at two moments. In that case there would be no necessity for the fourth predication, since its purpose would be served by the third predication, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.. But the word 'inexpresssible' is not an unmeaning iuxtaposition of syllables like abracadabra. It has a meaning, else it would not be used as a separate predicate in a separate proposition. Vimaladása, the author of the Saptabhangitarangiņi, here offers a solution, which, though it departs from the traditional interpretation, seems to be the most