Reality English Translation of Sarvarthasiddhi

SR No.: 001197
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S A Jain
Publisher: Jwalamalini Trust Chennai
Publication Year: 1992
Total Pages: 334
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Tattvartha Sutra, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 20 MB

Page 195

TIME ALSO IS A SUBSTANCE
163
both substance and qualities. For instance, if there be an aggregate of mutually different qualities, it becomes an identical one, and the aggregate itself would become non-existent, as these are mutually different. In the aggregate, the taste etc. would become different from colour. Then the aggregate would be identical with colour. Colour is different from tasto etc., and the aggregate is identical with colour. How, then, would not the aggregate be different from taste etc., which are different from colour? Therefore, the conclusion would be that colour alone is the aggregate. But one colour is not fit to become an aggregate or a collection. Hence it leads to the negation of the aggregate. Since there is no collection of qualities, there would be no substance which has a collection of qualities. Hence it would lead to the negation of substance and qualities. Similarly, it must be considered in the case of taste etc. Therefore, those who admit the collection of qualities must also admit that the collection of qualities is also somehow different from the qualities.
The substances, whose characteristic attributes have been described, would alone be entitled to be called substances. Hence the next sutra mentions the substance not referred to.
कालश्व Kalasca
(39) 39. Time also (is a substance).
"Time also' is the sutra. So the question arises, 'What is time also'? Substance is to be substituted. That is, 'Time also is a substance'. How is it? It has the characteristic attributes of a substance. Substance has been defined in two ways. Existence is characterized by origination, destruction and permanence. That which has qualities and modes is a substance. Both these definitions apply to time.
For instance, first the permanence of time according to its internal cause consists in the persistence of its own nature. Origination and destruction of time are based on external causes, and these are also due to internal causes in view of the rhythmic rise and fall effected by agurulaghu guna. Similarly,