Reality English Translation of Sarvarthasiddhi

SR No.: 001197
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S A Jain
Publisher: Jwalamalini Trust Chennai
Publication Year: 1992
Total Pages: 334
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Tattvartha Sutra, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 20 MB

Page 189

PERMANENCE AND NON-PERMANENCE
157
tence, condition or mode. A thing is seen as having the same nature with which it was seen formerly. So it is recognized in the form, This is the same as that'. If it be considered that the old thing has completely disappeared and that an entirely new thing is come into existence, then there can be no remembrance. And worldly relations based on it would be disturbed. Therefore, the indestructibility of the essential nature of a substance is determined as permanence. But it should be taken from one point of view. If it be permanent from all points of view, then there can be no change at all. And, in that case, transmigration as well as the way to salvation would become meaningless 2
A contention arises. It is a contradiction to say that a thing is permanent and it is not permanent. If it were permanent alone, there can be no destruction and origination, and impermanence would be negatived. If it were transient alone, there can be no continuance and hence no permanence. But there is no contradiction in that. अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धः
Il 32 11 Arpitānarpitasiddheḥ
(32) 32. (The contradictory characteristics are established) from different points of vie,
Substances are characterized by an infinite number of attributes. For the sake of use or need, prominence is given to certain characteristics of a substance from one point of view. And prominence is not given to other characteristics, as these are of no use or need at the time. Thus even the existing attributes are not expressed, as these are of secondary importance (anarpita). There is no contradiction in what is established by these two points of view. For instance, there is no contradiction in the same person Devadatta being a father, a son, a brother, a nephew and so on. For the points of viow are different. From the point of view of his son he is
1 i. e. the indestructibility of the past nature in the present.
2 If the soul were permanent (unchangeable) utterly, then transmigration of the soul as a man, a hell-being and so on and liberation, the end of transmigration, would both be impossible.