Jainism as Metaphilosophy

SR No.: 001194
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S Gopalan
Publisher: Satguru Publications Delhi
Publication Year: 1991
Total Pages: 92
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 5 MB

Page 81

Concluding Observations
71
be postulated. Whether any mind is actually perceiving or not and similarly whether any of the places from which the world is looked at are actually occupied or not, it can sull be maintained that an infinite number of views of the world are possible.
But even when we confine our attention to the actual observers and to the specific places from which the world is looked at, it cannot be gainsaid that different views are got. These are referred to as perspectives by Russell and he maintain that the different perspectives can be explained by sets of sense data which are peculiar to them. Thus, an aspect of the world (which is perceived from a particular perspective) is regarded by him as a member of the system of aspects which is the world. The aspect which is immediately perceived is a set of sense data and the world which is the system of all the different sense data apprehended through all possiblc perspectives, is a logical construction.
In terms of Russell's doctrine of perspectives explained above, the Jaina theory pf Anekānia can well be visualised as suggesting that the very possibility of divergent perspectives would indicate that a categorical asscrtion on behalf of any vicwpoint laken, would itself render it a subject for critical scrutiny. If various vicwpoints are possible, how can it be stalcd calcgorically that onc vicw alone is to be accepted as valid and all others rejected outright as untenable? Thus it is that Anekantavāda lays the cmphasis on thc meta-philosophical function of philosophy. This aspect of the work of philosophy is termed its critical function.
As we have explained, the critical function is not aimed at putting down systems of thought which have been deligently built nor condemning them for taking the standpoints that they do. It is rather aimed at bringing in the necessary corrective to all onc-sided views. Categorically maintaining the validity of any vicwpoint as against all others, deserves to be described as taking a one-sided view, and applying a corrective would signify espousing the need to be non-one-sided. This in turn points to turning away from the habit of outright rejection of theories on the count that one thcory alone is wholly acceptable.
It is worth rccounting that the Anekānta view, in this sense, it not born out of strategic consideratins but out of the recognition that comprehending Reaity involves that thcorics need to be analysed not with a vicw to merely identifying thcir pitfalls but with a view to finding out