Jainism as Metaphilosophy

SR No.: 001194
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S Gopalan
Publisher: Satguru Publications Delhi
Publication Year: 1991
Total Pages: 92
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 5 MB

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Jainism As Metaphilosophy
Furthermore, in the Jaina tradition inference (anumāna), one of the kinds of pramāņa, received an elaborate urcatment. A full-fledged theory of syllogism was also proposed." This would signify that the Jaina philosophers highlighted the important role played by logic in the process of philosophising, - in the process of building systems of philosophy as we have preferred to refer to it.
However, it should not be mistaken that the Jaina philosophers considered logic as the 'ultimate method' in philosophy. For, the doctrine of pramana held by them points to a stage where even the logical methods employed are to be set aside as ultimately not crucial.
The idea can be made clear by briefly referring to the various pramäņas accepted by the Jaina philosophers. One of the renowned Jaina philosophers, Umăsvati writes : “ Knowledge is of five varieties, viz. mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyāya and kevala. All these varieties are
pramāna." 14
Of these five means, mati-jñāna stands for determinate knowledge derived through the sense-organs and the mind. Sruta-jñāna stands for scriptural or verbal knowledge. This kind of knowledge also stands for knowledge derived through words which are symbols of thought, gestures, etc. Avadhi-jñāna is determinate knowledge of physical objects derived directly by the knower without the instrumentality of either the sense-organs or the mind. Manahparyāya-jñāna refers to the knowledge of other minds, i.e. the thoughts of the others. Kevala-jñāna is the determinate and unlimited knowledge of the whole of Reality that the individual derives directly.1s of the five types of knowledge mati and śruta are referred to as mediatc or indirect (parokşa)16 and avadhi, manahparyāya and kevala are referred to as immediate or direct
(pratyakşa).17
It would have become evident from the above classification of the pramāṇas that the importance accorded to pramāṇa well indicates the roles played by the sense-organs (as evidenced by the acceptance of perception as a source of knowledge) as well as the mind (as is obvious from the Jaina philosophers' conceding the inferential-logical processes as providing another means of knowing). All the same, envisaging knowledge (of Reality) as attainable without the help of either the