Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

Page 88

Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
•
79
are a seat of the same "universal' hornness. So when Kumārila defines similarity as two objects having some number of their component parts in common what he means is that one of those component parts as existing in one of those objects and the same as existing in the other are a seat of one and the same 'universa,', this explains why Kumārila always refuses to identify a "uuiversal' with similarity-on the plea that far from being identical with a 'universal' similarity itself presupposes a set of 'universals'. These are the central ideas present in Kumārila's mind while considering the Dature of similarity in the present part of his text. Tvo more points are noteworthy. Thus we are told that sometimes two objects are said to be similar not because they have some number of component parts in common but because a component part of one and a compont part of the other have some number of component parts in common; e. g. this is the sense in which an eye is, said to be similar to a lotus-petal (v. 19). Again, Kumārila consider the objection that two twins too are said to be similar even if they are not a seat of two different universal,'-both being a man; he answe. rs by simply exclaiming "Well this is what we observe. So what do you say?' (v. 22). Logically Kumärila should here recall his general position that even when two objects are a seat of one and the same 'universal' they are also a seat of their respective part. icular features--so that they are not only mutually identical but also mutually different and that two things which are mutually identical as well as mutually different can well be said to be mutually similar; but he does not say all this because of the fear that all this will amount to identifying a 'universal' with similarity, a contingency Kumarila dreads like anything. B: that as it miv, Kumārila next proceeds to consider the question as to what has to be the specific object of analogical cognition. He begins by observing that similarity resides in its entirety in each of the two parties concerned just as a 'universal' resides in its entirety in each and every one of the concerned particular objects (v. 35). So on Kumārila's showing when one perceives a gavaya in the forest one also perceives 'si nilarity-obtaining-between-a-cow-and-a-gavaya' as characterising this gavaya; and if at the same time one also recalls that one's cow at home is characterized by this very 'similarity' then this cow as characterized by this similarity' or this similarity' as characterizing this cow will be what constitutes an object of analogical cognition (vv. 35-37). Kunārila goes on to add that in this case ‘similarity' is an object of perception, cow an object of memory but cow as characterized by 'similarity' is an object of a vew means of valid cognition called 'analogy' - just as in that famous case the mountain is an object of perception, fire an object of memory but the mountain as characterized by fire is an object of a new means of valid cognition called 'inference' (vv.38-39). In this connection Kumātila thinks it necessary to argue that the case under consideration is not a case of inferential cogai. ton (vv. 43-51). In a nutshell his argument is that no inference can have for its thesis that cow is characterized by this similarity", for no probans will be ever ava. ilable for that; this 'similarity' as belonging to that cow cannot act as such a probans because that yet remains to be cognized (v. 43), this 'similarity' as belonging to