Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

Page 80

Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
71
the proban or the probandum or both. In this illustrative case probans is the feature 'being incorporeal and probandum the feature being eternal'. Here three invalid corroborative instances of the homologue type are an action (which lacks the probandum), an atom (which lacks the probans), a cloth (which lacks both) (vv. 115-16), while three invalid corroborative instances of the heterologue type are an atom (which possesses the probandum), a piece of cognition (which possesses the probans), sky (which possesses both) (v. 128). While quoting the first set of corroborative instances Kumärila says two noteworthy things about sky, viz.
(i) that sky, inspite of possessing both the probans and the probandum, will not be a valid corroborative instance for the disputant who denies the existence of sky (v. 116),
and (ii) that sky, inspite of possessing both the probans and the probandum, will not make the probans in question a valid probans since there exists an instance ---viz. an action where it is present along with an absence of the probandum (v. 117).
The first point is questionable, for, as already noted in another connection and will say be noted in one more connection, in a debate what exists for one party must exist also for the other. The second point is important; for it virtually amounts to conceding that all quoting of a corroborating instance (even of the homologue type) is a useless venture. And after quoting the set of invalid corroborative instances of the heterologus type Kumārila emphasizes that even this type of corroborative instance, though immediately showing forth the co-presence of 'absence of the probans' and 'absence of the probandum', is ultimately aimed at establishing a vyāpti between the probans and the probandum (v. 128); (immediately afterwards the point is re-emphasized that the mere availability of an instance where both the probans and the probandum are present will not establish a vyāpti between the probans and the probandum (vv. 129–130) ). Again, here also it is noted that inspite of thero being available a valid corroborative instance of the heterologue type in the form of a jar (which lacks both the probans and the probandum) the probans in question is an invalid probans since there exist an instance-viz. an action-where it is present along with an absence of the probandum (vv. 130-31); this virtually amounts to conceding that all quoting of a corroborative instance of the heterologue type is a useless venture. That the concept of a corroborative instance of the heterologue type is a particularly useless concept does not become clear from Kumārila's present illustrative case where the feature acting as probans and that acting as probandum are both such that everything possesses it or its absence; when the features concerned are not of this nature all sorts of utterly irrelevant things can be said in