Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

Page 78

Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
one should not at all bother about formulating vyāpti between X and Y, for corro. borative instances for that might not be easily available; on the other hand, corrobo. rative instances for the vyāpti obtaining between not-Y and not-X can be easily had in plenty (vv. 131-32)." In reply Kumārila repeats his recently made assertion (vv. 128-29) that vyāpti between not-Y and not-X is formulated just with a view to substantiating that between X and Y-so that formulating the latter vyāpti is always in place (vv. 131-32). More significantly, Kumārila-as if refuting the opponent in advance-had argued that even in the case of vyāpti between X and Y a stray collection of corroborative instances will not do, for distinction has to be made between a vyāpti proper and a mere co-presence (vv. 129-30). The argumentation has a very important implication. Thus Kumārila had come to notice not only that corro. borative instances of the heterologue type can be ruled off by way of supporting any and every vyāpti but also that even corroborative instances of the homologue type are not much difficult to collect in support of an invalid vyāpti (vv. 117, 13031). Hence his emphasis on the need for distinguishing between a vyāpti proper and a mere co-presence. Logically, this distinction should have implied the recognition that a vyāpti has to be formulated after making an exhaustive observation of a most varied type of corroborative instances and that even in the end the proviso has to be added that the vyāpti thus formulated is to be deemed valid so long-and only so long--as no contrary instances come to anyone's notice. Kumärila was certainly aware of some part of this implication but not of the whole of it. This becomes evident from the fact that he soon proceeds to explain how an all-time valid vyāpti is acquired on the basis of the observation of just few instances; his explanation lies in maintaining that the relation of vyāpti obtains between two features taken not in their particular aspect but in their universal aspect while this universal aspect of theirs is signified by the presence of an eternal-ubiquitous entity called 'universal' which resides in its entirety in its this locus or that (v. 133). If this explanation is really yalid then it becomes difficult to see why the observation just one corroborative instance should not make possible the establishment of the vyāpti concerned; for the 'universals' between which the vyāpti is alleged to obtain allegedly exist in their entirety in one corroborative instance as in another. In any case, this way Kumārila is led to discuss the question as to why then the old Mimāṁsā author distinguished between pratyakşatodršţa anumāna and sāmānyatodȚsta anumāna, for since the former phrase means 'inference based on perceptual cognition and the latter 'inference based on generic cognition' the latter type of inference alone seems to be based on a vyāpti that obtains between 'universals' (vv. 138-43); his verdict is that all vyāpti is a vyāpti obtaining between 'universals' but that those cases of the application of a vyāpti where the presence of the probans is cognized perceptually are called cases of pratyakşatodrsta anumana while those where the presence of the proban is cognized inferentially are called cases of sâmânyatodrsta anumana (vv. 144-45). This is a