Slokavartika a Study

SR No.: 001133
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit, Nagin J Shah, Dalsukh Malvania
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 132
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Nyay, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 11 MB

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Slokavārtika—a study
argues that if on the basis of attributing depotative capacity to a limited number of words it can be shown how meaning is had by an infinite number of sentences now possessed of these words now possessed of these, then it would be cumbersome to attribute denotative capacity to these infinite number of sentences themselves (vv. 121-22). Not does he concede that a sentence is thought to be made up of parts on the basis of falsely observing a similarity between two sentences, for on his view all observation of a similarity between two things presupposes that these things be really possessed of corresponding parts; otherwise, one can as well tell us that a rabbit's horn is similar to a donkey's horn (vv. 123-29). Even granting that two impartite sentences can somehow be similar Kumārila points out that we usually extract out from a sentence letters and words that are common to several sentences, something which should not be possible if all sentences are equally impartite (v. 134). The opponent maintains that a sentence is an eternal, impartite entity which is made manifest by dhvanis; Kumārila retorts that dhvanis can make manifest a sentence never except part by part but that it is in the very nature of things impossible for an impartite sentence to be made manifest part by part (vv. 137-38). He next argues that if all part of a sentence is unreal then a small sentence which is part of a big sentence should be equally unreal; and if it is replied that the small sentence in question is real because it is found to exist even separately then it should equally be conceded that the words of a sentence are real because they are found to exist even separately (vv. 140-41). The opponent argues that individual words are unreal because they are never employed in practice (v. 143); Kumārila points out that there are cases when individual words assume practical importance. For example, while learning a text one seeks to know what each and every word of it means (v, 146). Then Kumārila argues that simply because they are not employed practically the individual words should not be dismissed as unreal just as simply because they are not employed practically the component-parts of a chariot should not be dismissed as unreal (v. 148). Nor is Kumārila frightened by the opponent's argument that if words are the parts of a sentence and letters the parts of a word then one might as well posit parts of a letter (v. 150); his plain point is that a thing does not become unreal simply because it is made up of parts(v. 151); at the same time he argues that simply because a word is made up of parts one should not insist that even a letter should be made up of parts just as simply because a jar is made up of parts one should not insist that even an atom should be made up of parts (v. 152). The opponent argues that the division of a sentence into words is false just as the division of a word into a root and a suffix is false; Kumärila retorts that there is nothing false about the division of a word into a root and a suffix; for example, the words vīkşam and vặkşeņa have got the same root and different suffixes while the words vīkşam and ghatam have got the same suffix and different roots (vv. 154-60). The opponent points out that in the meanings of the words kūpa, yüpa and Süpa nothing common corresponds to the common word-part üpa; Kumārila replies that a word-part is declared to have a meaning only when concomitance in presence and